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标题:Disclosure Quality and Management Trading Incentives
时间:2019-12-03 22:34:54
DOI:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00308.x
作者:Jonathan Lawrence Rogers
关键词:disclosure quality;liquidity;information asymmetry;insider trading
出版源: 《Social Science Electronic Publishing》 ,2008 ,46 (5) :1265-1296
摘要:This study examines whether managers strategically alter disclosure "quality" in response to personal incentives, specifically those derived from trading on their own account. Using changes in market liquidity to proxy for disclosure quality, I find that trading incentives are associated with disclosure quality choices. Tests are performed across three disclosure samples: management forecasts, conference calls, and press releases. Consistent with a desire to reduce the probability of litigation, I find evidence that managers provide higher quality disclosures before selling shares than they provide in the absence of trading. Consistent with a desire to maintain their information advantage, I find some, albeit weaker, evidence that managers provide lower quality disclosures prior to purchasing shares than they provide in the absence of trading.
大小:296 kb
页数:33 PAGES
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